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Abstract: In the last decades the idea of creativity has gained increasing 
interest in the field of philosophy, cognitive sciences, sociology, etc. 
and there have been renewed contributions regarding the classic idea of 
creativity. We consider that the contribution of classic pragmatism deserves 
special mention—particularly in the works of Charles. S. Peirce and John 
Dewey. In this article, we are going to refer exclusively to the Deweyan 
treatment of this idea. We will sustain that Dewey’s theory provides 
interpretative elements which are innovative and disruptive regarding 
the philosophical tradition including a novelty conception of creative 
imagination. We will expose some consequences of his position—as we 
interpret it. In effect, we are going to sustain that Dewey moves away 
from classic demands according to which a creative product involves, 
necessarily, a radical transformation of human life, according to the idea 
of degrees of creativity; that this Deweyan theory constitutes an interesting 
insight for promoting the creative attitude; that the creative process retains 
the same structure in all cases—science and art, for example—and that 
creativity is now an intrinsic potentiality of human beings—which may be 
realized or not. Finally, we consider the relevance of some Deweyan theses 
for nowadays positions, as in the case of the cognitive psychologist Robert 
Weisberg, emphasizing their coincidences and disagreements.
Keywords: Creativity. Degrees of creativity. Dewey. Imagination. 
Innovation. Weisberg.
Resumo: Nas últimas décadas, a ideia de criatividade vem recebendo 
um interesse cada vez maior nos campos da filosofia, ciências cognitivas, 
sociologia, etc. e teve uma contribuição renovada com relação à ideia 
clássica de criatividade. Consideramos que a contribuição do pragmatismo 
clássico merece uma menção especial—em particular, as obras de Charles 
S. Peirce e John Dewey. Neste artigo, iremos nos referir, exclusivamente, 
ao tratamento deweyiano dessa ideia. Sustentaremos que a teoria de 
Dewey fornece elementos interpretativos que são inovadores e disruptivos 
com relação à tradição filosófica, inclusive, uma concepção inédita da 
imaginação criativa. Exporemos algumas consequências de sua posição—
como nós a interpretamos. Com efeito, sustentaremos que Dewey afasta-
se das demandas clássicas para as quais um produto criativo envolve, 
necessariamente, uma transformação radical da vida humana, segundo 
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a ideia de níveis de criatividade; essa teoria deweyiana constitui um 
insight interessante para a promoção da atitude criativa; este processo 
criativo preserva a mesma estrutura em todos os casos—ciência e arte, por 
exemplo—e esta criatividade é, agora, uma potencialidade intrínseca dos 
seres humanos—a qual pode ser realizada ou não. Por fim, consideramos 
a relevância de algumas teses deweyianas para posições atuais, como no 
caso do psicólogo cognitivo Robert Weisberg, enfatizando as coincidências 
e desacordos de ambos.
Palavras-chave: Criatividade. Dewey. Imaginação. Inovação. Níveis de 
criatividade. Weisberg.
1 Introduction
The idea of creativity has been defended for centuries in our culture. In its most 
generalized version, both in the world of science and art, it has been made explicit in 
terms of a novel product that impacts the world and transforms it in a notorious way. 
Also, in a well-known version, it is related to the performance of mysterious forces, 
intuitions1 or as a possibility restricted to privileged beings. Another common feature 
of the traditional idea of creativity is that art and science are opposite activities since 
art is a product of the imagination and creativity, while science is the product of 
observation and calculation.
However, since the late nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth 
century, there have been renewed contributions regarding this classic idea of 
creativity. It is also true that in the last decades this subject has gained increasing 
interest and has been reconsidered in the field of philosophy, cognitive psychology, 
sociology, etc. We consider that in the field of philosophy, the contributions of 
classical pragmatism deserve special mention, particularly, in the work of Charles 
Peirce and in that of John Dewey, heir to a large extent of Peircean developments. 
In this paper, however, we are going to refer exclusively to the Deweyan experience 
theory. We will argue that, understood in terms of transactional and transformational 
action theory, it offers a promising framework for accounting for human creative 
processes in an acceptable and novel way. In short, following John Dewey and 
the important contributions made by Hans Joas,2 we will defend the idea that 
experience understood as transforming action is the key to understanding the notion 
of creativity in Dewey. A theory that, as we will suggest at the end, allows us to test 
alternative solutions currently discussed.
1 About intuition, for example, Dewey says: “The term ‘intuition’ is one of the most 
ambiguous in the whole range of thought. In the theories just considered, it is supposed 
to have essence as its proper object.” (LW 10:299).
2 Joas analyses, in several works, the contributions made by the classic pragmatic tradition 
regarding action and creativity theory. He argues that the pragmatic conception of 
creativity lies in the pragmatic understanding of human action itself. And he highlights 
that the most complete development in this regard was achieved by John Dewey, who 
develops his experience theory in terms of action theory, a transactional action theory. 
(See: JOAS, 1996).
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2 Experience, creativity and imagination in John Dewey
2.1 Experience and creativity
To begin with, let us remember that Dewey has been critical regarding the traditional 
experience theories. Dewey considers that they would have offered reductionist 
interpretations of the human experience itself, especially by linking it exclusively 
with the processes of knowledge. This means for example, that for tradition, having 
an experience of a flavor, a color or an object means to have knowledge of them—
either we then consider it a real knowledge to build science or a mere belief; also, 
by linking it to sensations or impressions that would occur in the subjects’ minds, 
experience would have a mental or subjective character and it is consequently 
considered a sort of cognitive mental copy whose central reference is to the past. 
And, therefore, as Federico López says (2014, p. 99),
Insofar as experience is a record of what is actually felt or 
perceived, it differs from that which is thought or inferred, and 
all relation and all inference can only be a later addition, alien 
to experience itself, whose validity we can and must, as a matter 
of principle, doubt. Experience is an experience of discrete 
elements that then the imagination, reason, intellect or any 
other faculty that we suppose to have must relate or synthesize, 
adding to experience something that by definition is foreign to 
it. (LÓPEZ, 2014, p. 99).
Situation that Vincent Colapietro (2009, p. 4) reminds us, with very significant words 
of Dewey himself: “It has said, Lord, Lord, Experience, Experience; but in practice it 
has served ideas forced into experience, not gathered from it” (MW 10:10-11).
Against these theories, Dewey suggests an experience theory whose 
characteristics are such that they allow us to collect the whole of human experience, 
one anchored in the activity of agents who are always situated. He thus holds 
that the very nature of experience is determined by the essential conditions of life 
itself. To move forward, Dewey only requires us initially to accept a distinction 
between living beings and inert objects, between the animate and the inanimate. 
He illustrates what he means by stating that, indeed, if a rock suffers the effects of 
a force and if that force is greater than the mechanical strength of the rock, it will 
break; otherwise, the rock will remain unchanged. What will never happen is for 
the rock to react or fight to maintain its integrity. Accordingly, what distinguishes 
animate beings from inanimate beings is then their ability to react, their capacity to 
act. Experience and action are then intertwined from the beginning and constitute 
the ordinary forces and conditions of experience, which also commits itself to levels 
of continuity between animal and human life. We want to emphasize then that 
action is constituted from the most elemental to the most complex stages of life, in 
the most basic analysis category to give meaning to what we mean by “experience.”3
3 As we have said elsewhere, Dewey is indebted to Peirce in his novel way of conceiving 
experience. The naturalist approach and the crucial role of action are some of the inherited 
ideas, originally expressed in “How to Make Our Ideas Clear” (1878) and “The Fixation 
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In Knowing and the Known (1949, LW 16:96), Dewey and Bentley, focusing 
on the specific analysis of experience in terms of action, specify the perspective from 
which to understand it. Briefly, there they specify that if experience itself is to be 
understood in terms of transactional action, then this means, among other things, 
that we will no longer understand any active process as occurring between things 
and objects that exist on the one hand, apart from human subjects, nor to the human 
beings involved as existing in a totally separate way from things.4 Thus, unlike the 
consequences that other conceptions must assume, their position is not required to 
deal with the problem of forcing the human being and the world to fit into some 
type of organization or connection. They are interconnected from the beginning: the 
human organism develops, lives, and modifies with and in the rest of the cosmos.
A nearly natural consequence of this thesis is that if science, art and common 
sense should be treated in terms of transactions, none of these fields can therefore be 
seen as consisting of entities that are separate, complete and closed-in on themselves, 
even when this contradicts traditional philosophy in its diverse conceptions.5
In order to emphasize nuances, let us also remember that Dewey identifies 
vital and transactional experience in terms of Art. Art in the productive and active 
sense in which Ancient Greece assimilated the productive or useful arts to practice 
itself. From this new perspective, Dewey emphasizes that both scientific research and 
artistic activities—or of any kind—are potentially creative activities.6 Thus, according 
to Dewey, they include processes able to bring into existence something novel and 
transformative. It is interesting to recall here that Dewey’s recovery of the Aristotelian 
dimensions of praxis is modified in a very original way. Indeed, the transactional 
conception of Practice, Art or Experience, in Dewey’s terms, includes a component 
that emphasizes the transforming power of has been transformed by human agents. 
In short, we can think that the use of the transactional concept allows Dewey to 
sustain the agent and patient character of the subject in interactive processes and also, 
the agency of the material world itself—an ignored or underemphasized perspective 
when the word used is interaction, within the framework of contemporary action 
theories, or praxis in the Aristotelian point of view.
of Belief” (1877). Thus, the formulation of the pragmatic maxim, the idea according to 
which beliefs are habits and rules for action; as well as the famous doubt-belief structure, 
dissatisfaction-satisfaction that show the deep commitment to the intrinsically active 
nature of the human condition, are the Peircean germ of the conception of experience, 
understood as a problem solving activity, linked to the search for enjoyment, stability 
and adjustment with the environment, which receives deeper development in Dewey’s 
work, not without differences with the Father of American classic pragmatism. (See: DI 
GREGORI-PÉREZ RANSANZ, 2017).
4 Dewey and Bentley clearly argue that the transactional perspective is opposed to the 
perspective of self-action and the perspective of interaction. (See: LW 16:101).
5 Let us also remember that the term transaction was stated by Dewey in his article 
“Conduct and Experience” (1930).
6 As we have said elsewhere, “[…] according to the Stagirite, knowledge […] concerns the 
active processes of production, generation and transformation of the world. Of course, 
the world that “corresponds” to it is changeable, is subject to changes and scientists as 
audience have given way to agents that research, experiment, intervene and transform 
the world according to their targeted action”. (LÓPEZ and DI GREGORI, 2017).
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In short, Dewey’s creativity theory, in accordance with his conception of 
experience and understood from a transactional viewpoint, commits to the following 
theses: (a) creativity combines continuity with novelty. Both the artist and the 
scientist produce from a background of knowledge, attitude and inherited values, 
from which their creations are developed. The activity they are engaged in is always 
situated and affects the previously existing background, material that is deliberately 
controlled and targeted at one object or purpose. Then, art and science do not differ 
in the processes that characterize them but in the means and ends they are aimed 
at; (b) creativity does not spring from mysterious or sudden inspirations but it is the 
result of effort and work; (c) This is not a capacity for privileged beings but one that 
all human beings share and, therefore, may be exercised in all areas of human life.
The active, transactional and transformational nature of experience is at 
the basis of Dewey’s statements when, moreover, he claims that his conception 
of creativity certainly avoids any classic representationalist commitment. Taking 
the artistic creativity and its non-representational nature as an example, he argues 
that in the context he develops, the idea he distinguishes between the pre-artistic 
material—shared by all human beings—and the artistic work material itself, in which 
the shared material turns into something individual and unique thanks to the artist’s 
creative vision. An artist’s work, thus, is not representative (or imitative, we can add) 
of something previously existing but represents a transformation of the ordinary 
material thanks to the application of a new and individual mode of experience,7 a 
transformation which, depending on the degrees of impact achieved, will transform 
collective life as well.
Similar conclusions can be drawn regarding the production of scientific 
knowledge. Indeed, scientific research is not a mere description of the states of 
pre-existing things either—it does not merely represent a world intended to be 
fixed and stable; it does not merely suggest a rule of action either. Knowledge is a 
transformation of the world we know.8
Another issue to bear in mind is that Dewey distinguishes between different 
types of experience. There are experiences which are equivalent to the sum of mere 
series of sensations, that is, there are mechanical responses to normal situations of 
ordinary life; there are experiences interrupted by distraction or other reasons, but 
there are also others which are constituted as genuine experiences; Dewey refers to the 
7 We think that another important pertinent consequence of this position is development 
in our time by Vincent Colapietro. He said “It no longer makes sense to locate the source 
of creativity in the subject. The subject is a constituted and situated being […]. Hence, 
whatever conscious and ingenious agency we can attribute to individual subjects such as 
a creative artist […]. We can do so only with a critical awareness of the way and extent 
such attributions have little or nothing to do with the original capacities of isolated 
individuals.” (COLAPIETRO, 2003, p. 64).
8 Similarly, Dewey says regarding scientific activity: “The position here taken holds, on the 
contrary, that declarative propositions, whether of facts or of conceptions (principles and 
laws) are intermediary means or instruments (respectively material and procedural) of 
effecting that controlled transformation of subject-matter which is the end-in-view (and 
final goal) of all declarative affirmations and negations” (LW 12:162, our emphasis). 
And add: “The philosophic basis of the representative theory is compelled to omit this 
qualitative novelty that characterizes every genuine work of art.” (LW 10:292).
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latter in terms of having an experience. He insists that those experiences which result 
in a unified whole, which display beginning development and closing or fulfillment 
phases, should be distinguished from other types of experience. Dewey says,
In contrast with such experience, we have an experience when 
the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then and 
then only is it integrated within and demarcated in the general 
stream of experience from other experiences. A piece of work 
is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its 
solution; (LW 10:42).
What allows the difference between one and the other to be drawn is a specific 
aspect of its immediate quality which is referred to as emotional; having an experience 
refers to the course of an action in which, through consecutive events, a significance 
is maintained, which is preserved and accumulated to a certain end, which, at the 
same time, is identified as the culmination of a process. Every experience of this kind 
has an emotional aesthetic quality and that is “the grounding and unifying instance 
of the process of having an experience.”9 And even though the aesthetic quality is 
generally present in every experience, we should distinguish between the function of 
quality in scientific research and artistic activities. Finally, what we wish to highlight 
with these considerations is that, according to Dewey, the experiences classified as 
having an experience constitute the suitable candidates in the field of creativity.10
Ultimately, creativity is now an inherent capacity or potentiality of all human 
beings, necessarily involved in a constant change or reorganization of their 
habits, institutions and material world; it is also an intrinsic potential of action, of 
9 As Dewey reminds us in Experience and Nature (1958), it is undeniable that there are 
multiple activities that do not have an intrinsically enjoyable meaning. A good deal 
of daily tasks —at home, factory, laboratory or office— fall into that group. Since we 
do not have the appropriate language resources, that is, those which allow us to call 
them aesthetic or artistic, we are satisfied in calling them useful and move forward. 
But he argues that if we asked ourselves what they are useful for, we would be forced 
to review their real consequences, and challenged by them, we would likely find that 
those activities are (harmful/damaging) rather than something useful. According to 
Dewey, sacrificing the aesthetic quality may have serious consequences for life itself. 
Following this direction, we can say that the Dewey’s reflections on aesthetic qualities 
have a remarkable relevance. Richard Shusterman (2012, p. 109) says that “Aesthetic 
experience (with its sensory appreciative perception of aesthetic qualities) constitutes a 
far wider realm than the experience of art. And this brings us to our second key trend of 
aesthetics today, the expansion of the aesthetic field beyond the Hegelian paradigm of 
the philosophy of fine art. There are several reasons for this change of perspective. There 
is the growing philosophical tedium (even when not explicitly expressed) of limiting 
aesthetics to fine art and the repeated rehashing of the issues of its definition, ontology, 
individuation of works, and the logic of their criticism.
10 A complex idea of experience, understood in terms of action, which includes qualitative 
and emotional components, in many cases deliberative, can be understood, as Vincent 
Colapietro does in terms of drama. And, as many colleagues think, particularly for the 
case of creative experience, one that includes emotional processes of suffering. We will 
advance on these questions in future work.
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transactional processes, by means of which human beings and the world mutually 
change, reorganize and modify as naturally as people sow and harvest.
2.2 Creative imagination
Nevertheless, creativity requires imagination. According to Dewey, imagination is 
a capacity for ordering and making sense of our experience; it enables, he insists, 
old and familiar things to become new experience. It is not possible either to create 
without imagination or to understand what has been created without it; needless 
to say, it is a privileged component in the creative process as a whole. Also, it is 
a component that goes beyond the scope of artistic activities, contrary to what is 
usually argued, and which, as Fesmire (2003) reminds us, is as natural to human life 
as are muscle movements.11
Dewey says,
[…] the experience enacted is human and conscious only as 
that which is given here and now is extended by meanings 
and values drawn from what is absent in fact and present only 
imaginatively. (LW 10:276).
Indeed, Dewey argues that, for example, to say as  has been done, that the 
imaginative capacity falls within the field of fine arts is a false idea of the nature of 
imagination, insisting that every conscious experience necessarily has a certain type 
of imagination. As Fesmire (2003) points out, it can be said that the very core of 
Dewey’s concept of imagination refers to the ability to recognize what we have in 
front of us in light of what that could be. According to Dewey, imagination is,
The large and generous blending of interests at the point where 
the mind comes in contact with the world. When old and familiar 
things are made new in experience, there is imagination. When 
the new is created, the far and strange become the most natural 
inevitable things in the world. (LW 10:272).
Dewey assigns the imaginative capacity or quality to every human experience 
without ignoring a series of distinctions. One of them relates to the imagination 
activity captured in dreams, reveries or a certain type of fiction. In these processes, 
imagination:
[…] forms the matter of reverie, of dream; ideas are floating, 
not anchored to any existence as its property, its possession of 
meanings […]. The pleasure they afford is the reason why they 
are entertained and are allowed to occupy the scene […] (LW 
10:277).
11 Fesmire adds, “Dewey cautions against the custom of identifying the imaginative, which 
is interactively engaged and rooted in problematic conditions, with the imaginary, which 
is subjective. “Neither the imaginative nor the imaginary occurs ex nihilo, independent of 
a bio-cultural matrix, but only the imaginative necessitates courage to engage the present 
and stretch.” (2003, p. 65).
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By contrast, creative imagination is controlled by the interest in promoting 
or anticipating an adjustment between old and new, and this “purpose rules the 
selection and natural development.” A type of imagination he also calls virtually 
creative; an essential instrument to overcome the strength of the experiences merely 
mechanical and common. Far from being a product of frivolity and a whim, they 
embody a process laden with meanings and rooted in issues that, unlike mere 
fantasy, are bound by the purpose of promoting adjustments and changes to the 
situation out of which it emerges.12
Finally, according to Dewey, the so-called creative imagination represents the 
highest degree of potentiality of imagination itself. In his work Psychology, Dewey, 
referring to it, argues that,
The highest form of imagination, however, is precisely an organ 
of penetration into the hidden meaning of things, meaning not 
visible to perception or memory, nor reflectively attained by the 
processes of thinking […] In its highest form, imagination is not 
confined to isolation and combination of experiences already 
had, even when these processes occur under the influence of 
sensitive and lively emotion. It is virtually creative. It makes its 
object new by setting it in a new light. (EW 2:171).
3 Final comments
Ultimately, while it is true that Dewey does not develop an explicit creativity and 
imagination theory, we believe that, as Joas points out, it is possible to identify such 
a theory and that it provides interpretative elements which are really innovative and, 
disruptive regarding the philosophical tradition.
Among the innovations we wish to underline because we understand they 
constitute key axes for exploring further this issue, I mention the following:
1. It highlights the distinction suggested between mere imagination and 
creative imagination. Creative imagination is controlled by the interest in 
promoting or anticipating an adjustment between old and new. It is not the 
imagination based on a whim or reverie—which, of course, also exists.
2. It emphasizes that imagination and creativity are not the result of an 
individual activity understood as a dedicated flight from this world; they 
are not a result of the initiative of autonomous human subjects nor they 
can be generated but from within experience transactionally understood; 
this without forgetting that, according to Dewey, individuality is also a 
potentiality that is only performed by interacting with environmental 
conditions. In the transaction process, the capacities inherent to individuality 
transform and constitute a self.
12 “When old and familiar things are made new in experience, there is imagination. When 
the new is created, the far and strange become the most natural inevitable things in the 
world. There is always some measure of adventure in the meeting of mind and universe, 
and this adventure is, in its measure, imagination […]” (LW 10:272).
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3. It is interesting to think that Dewey moves away from classic demands 
according to which a creative product is that which necessarily involves 
a radical transformation of human life. Creativity is now an intrinsic 
potentiality of humans which may be realized or not. And even though 
the creative process retains the same structure in all cases, the impact of 
transformation may be differentiated in degrees. Not only is this consistent 
with the ubiquitous although non-trivial nature of creativity but it also 
suggests that Dewey’s theory constitutes an interesting insight for promoting 
the creative attitude.
4. Last but not least, taking into consideration the case of  science or art in 
particular, a potentially creative product should be deemed positive by the 
relevant public area (either the scientific community or the community of 
artists, etc.) for its incorporation. If the novelty is rejected, the product is 
not creative for the community, is not transforming, at least, until further 
notice. The audience concerned plays an important role in turning the 
proposal into a creative event. But this requires further explanations. In 
fact, it is currently a very debated idea because it seems to implicate that 
in these cases there is no creativity in any sense. We consider that this is 
not a good version of Dewey’s position. Based on the idea of the degrees 
of creativity, we can say that, even in those cases, there was individual 
creativity and that the individual himself was transformed in that process 
(always taking into account the renewed concept of individual and 
community held by Dewey).13
On the other hand, it is interesting to note that even contemporary positions 
sharing central theses with Dewey’s conceptions, as in the case of the cognitive 
psychologist Robert Weisberg, suggest reserving the term creativity for the creative 
individual’s production and the word innovation for the process by which the 
potentially creative product is eventually valued. However, the public assessment 
process of novelty may not be part of the definition of creativity itself. Or in other 
words, the main theme of creativity even in an interactional context like Weisberg’s, 
unconsciously intends to continue to be a strictly individual issue. In the first 
case, it could be said that, from Dewey’s point of view, it would be falling into a 
dichotomous commitment, and, moreover, not compatible with Weisberg’s position, 
while it is emphatically distinguished between the public and the private since, as 
Dewey points out,
13 In Shusterman terms, (2000, p. 58-59) “If Dewey’s definition is valuable, its value lies 
not in achieving a wholesale conceptual revolution and satisfying our traditional impulse 
for general definition, but in its directive gesture towards remedying certain painful 
limitations in art’s institutional practice […]. So rather than pursuing Dewey’s totalizing 
definitional quest, I instead aim, in the spirit of piecemeal of pragmatist labor, to make 
a more specific case for widening art`s borders to forms of popular culture and to the 
ethical art of fashioning one’s life.” […] “rethinking art as experience might help effect 
the artistic legitimation of a form like rock music, which affords such frequent and 
intensely gratifying aesthetics experience to so many people […].”
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The distinction between private and public is thus in no sense 
equivalent to the distinction between individual and social, even 
if we suppose that the latter distinction has a definite meaning. 
Many private acts are social; their consequences contribute to 
the welfare of the community or affect its status and prospects. 
In the broad sense any transaction deliberately carried on 
between two or more persons is social in quality. It is a form of 
associated behavior and its consequences may influence further 
associations. A man may serve others, even in the community at 
large, in carrying on a private business. (LW 2:243-244).14
In other cases, the same differentiation is used to distinguish the “minor” 
instances of creativity in terms of innovation, reserving the term creativity for “major 
changes” causing an impact on human life. The interpretation of what we call 
“degrees” of transformational change in Dewey would also evade the need for such 
complex distinctions.
Ultimately, the Deweyan creativity theory promotes further development taking 
into account its promising utility within the current framework of life, especially if 
we believe, as he does, that creative intelligence projects new and more complex 
goals for life and that in the creative process it is a matter of collectively valuing the 
changes in life itself in a positive way … or not. 
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